ABSTRACT The integration of distributed generations (DGs) is transforming the traditional radial single-source distribution system into a complex multi-source one which requires its related protection is able to maintain proper coordination under bidirectional power flow conditions. Although the conventional backup protection methods are effective up to a certain level of DG penetration, they are incompetent for higher service demands such as high DG penetration and protective rapidity. To deal with such a problem, a fast and reliable backup protection strategy is presented on the basis of a proposed device detection method. In the proposed backup strategy, the device failure-related backup protection is started in advance to accelerate the fault isolation by locking the failed primary protection which can be predicted by the proposed device detection method. The presented strategy possesses an excellent performance on rapidity and stability. Particularly, the fault isolation area is only expanded to the upper level circuit breaker via our protection strategy. The performance of the proposed backup strategy has been validated by the realistic system and the real-time digital simulator (RTDS) system.
I. INTRODUCTION
With growing power demand and increasing concern about low-carbon environment, the new paradigm of distributed generation (DG) is gaining commercial and technical importance across the globe, especially in distribution networks [1] . Actually, economic incentives for renewables in most countries provide a boost to pervasion of DG, which is expected to grow further. Owing to the increasing penetration of DGs, the traditional distribution network is undergoing a change from the single source and radial system to the complex multi-source one, which in turn, would result in conflicts with the correct protection operations/procedures of the present distribution networks [2] . Integration of DGs requires that its related protection is capable of maintaining proper
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was M. Jaya Bharata Reddy. coordination under bidirectional power flow conditions (i.e., remaining the grid-connection of DGs for a short time under fault conditions) [3] . The protection must also be effective under unpredictable fault currents.
Furthermore, the quality of electric power service is put on a high level in some high-quality-service areas with high penetration DGs such as industrial manufacturing center and Hi-tech Zone [4] , [5] . In China Southern Power Grid and State Grid, some new technical specifications for distribution automation system (DL/T 721-2013, DL/T 814 [6] and Q/CSG1203017-2016 [7] ) require that power service interruption is limited to milliseconds and the backup failure isolation area can be only extended to the upper relay (or breaker) level. In such cases, a fast and reasonable backup protection procedure is therefore necessary for improving the power supply reliability and the customer satisfaction. 
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
To cope with the above aforementioned problems, researchers have actively proposed new principles and technologies which can be generally summarized into two categories ( Table 1 ). The first one is the local backup protection (LBP), the idea of which is fundamentally by using the local information to locate faults. The other is the wide-area backup protection (WABP) which, based on the wide area electrical quantity information, is mainly response for system-level faults and abnormal operating conditions [8] .
In the former, conventional device (recloser-fuse or relay) coordination protections (DCP) used in radial distribution systems, are prone to miscoordination in the presence of DGs because of the change in the magnitude and direction of currents during the fault period [9] . In [10] , a novel approach has been developed to reduce the cases of miscoordination by classifying recloser-fuse coordination status. Further, an optimum recloser-fuse coordination scheme has been presented in [11] for the radial distribution system with DGs. Moreover, the adaptive device coordination protection (ADCP) schemes proposed recently such as in [12] - [15] , which employ adaptive principle to update relays settings in accordance with the actual system status, are able to provide highly effective primary and backup protection for distribution networks with high penetration of DGs. The adaptive distance protection (ADP) [16] , [17] , though which has advantages in selectivity compared with time-overcurrent protection, will suffer from the problem of under-reaching because the infeeds created by DGs cause the impedance presented to an upstream relay to higher than the actual. Moreover, in the above distance or over-current backup protection, the stepped setting rules will result in ultra-long acting delay, usually 0.5s to 1.5s in practice, which seriously threatens the equipment even the system stability. Time-domain differential protection (TDP) method [18] is able to provide a secure and dependable solution with fast tripping. However, it is only applied to the primary protection of transmission lines.
Recent advancement in wide area measure system (WAMS) has led to the development of WABP methods which locate and isolate faults by using the wider range information, instead of only local information. The phasor measurement unit-based protection (PMUP) methods [19] - [23] can provide effective backup protection for distribution systems by utilizing time synchronized measurements from PMUs. However, PMUs cannot be installed at all the buses due to economical constrains; on the other hand, measurement noise and communication error may cause protection failure [19] . By combining the information of existing distance protection zone-I, zone-II and zone-III, the wide area-based distance protection (WADP) methods [24] - [26] can identify fault of transmission lines. But the fluctuation (or disconnection) of DGs may considerably change the positive-sequence impedance of the fault path, which cause the distance relays to maloperate. The wide area intelligent protections (WAIPs) including multi-objective optimization [27] , neural networks [28] and multi-agents-based algorithms [29] - [31] , can solve the problem of high penetration of DGs. However, the WAIPs have to recalculate the parameters in event of changes to the network topology of DG penetration, thereby, imposing huge computation and communication overheads on the protection system [3] . Moreover, the primary and back-up protections in WAIPs are usually required to operate on different principles [31] . In addition, the wide area differential protection (WADP) [8] , [32] - [38] extends the protective area to the adjacent area, providing the rapid main protection as well as good-selective backup protection. Inevitably, the WADP relies on the control center based on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). For large-scale power systems, when all decisions are taken by such a control center, it is very difficult to handle all these calculations and communications in real time [39] .
In summary, the conventional LBP methods have the inherent advantage in rapidity and reliability for radial distribution system. As modern distribution system with high penetration DGs grows increasingly complex, it is becoming extremely difficult for the LBPs to coordinate the sensitivity and selectivity simultaneously. On the other hand, the WABP, as remedial action scheme (RAS), is extremely dependent on control center and WAMS, it is therefore difficult to meet the requirement that the response time should be within a few tens or hundreds of milliseconds at all time.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper develops a fast and reliable backup protection strategy, in which the current differential principle with an adjusted restrain characteristic is employed to locate the electrical fault. The proposed strategy has the advantages of both LBP and WABP in rapidity, stability and practicability for smart distribution system with high penetration of DGs. Moreover, the fault isolation area is able to be only expanded to the upper level circuit breaker via our protection strategy. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) A fast and reliable LBP strategy is presented in this paper. The main idea of the proposed strategy is that the device failure-related backup protection is started in advance to accelerate the electrical fault isolation by locking the predictably failed primary protection after device detection. And the proposed strategy locates the fault by the current differential principle with an adjusted restraint characteristic.
2) A device (CT, communication or breaker) detection method, which aims to predict the state of device failurerelated primary protection, is presented in this paper.
3) A traditional local communication architecture is extended by information forwarding technology to provide with backup communication channels and to avoid transmission congestion for the proposed backup strategy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II proposes the extended communication architecture for the proposed backup protection. In section III, the differential ring definition and parameter coordination of differential backup protection is presented. Section IV introduces the device detection method and the backup protection strategy based on the proposed device detection method. In section V, the performance of the proposed backup protection strategy is tested. Finally, the conclusions are given in the section VI.
II. THE EXTENDED LOCAL COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
In this section, using an information forwarding technology, a local communication architecture is extended to provide high-efficient backup data transmission channel and to avoid transmission congestion for the proposed backup protection.
The extended communication architecture is based on a peer to peer (P2P) communication, and the synchronized clocks based on IEC 1588 standard [40] are provided by the WAMS. As shown in Fig. 1(a) , the original physical communication network in the extended communication architecture is a hand-to-hand structure, in which each intelligent integrated terminals (IIT) is connected with its neighbor IITs hand-in-hand by the optical fibers. The IITs collect the electrical synchronized information from lines and transmit it to their neighbors.
Via information forwarding technology in which each IIT node forwards neighbor's information to all other neighbors in real time, each IIT can logically communicates with its neighbors and neighbors of neighbors. As a consequence, a logically extended local communication can be obtained, as shown in Fig. 1(b) . In this way, both primary and backup communication channels are established by the physical (red solid lines in Fig. 1(b) ) and logically extended (blue dotted lines in Fig. 1(b) ) communication lines.
Note that though the WAMS can be also selected as the communication system for the proposed backup strategy, here the extended local communication system is chosen because it can accelerate the backup protection process by avoiding the broadcast storms and transmission congestion.
III. DIFFERENTIAL RING DEFINITION AND PARAMETER COORDINATION OF DIFFERENTIAL BACKUP PROTECTION
This section mainly focuses on the definition of backup differential ring and parameter coordination of differential backup protection. The former, combining the proposed backup protection strategy, can minimize the backup fault isolation zone to the upper level circuit breaker; while the latter, along with an adjusted restraint parameter, is able to locate fault correctly so as not to pick up the load currents in backup zone.
A. DIFFERENTIAL RING DEFINITION
In the current differential protection, the fault point is located by comparing current's differential quantities of any area, which is defined as a differential ring (DR). In the normal condition, DR obeys Kirchhoff's laws (KCL), i.e., the current difference of ends of DR equals zero theoretically, while KCL is not satisfied for fault state. By using the extended communication, a new differential backup protection is proposed with a special DR for backup protection. Note that the proposed protection requires a circuit breaker for each line. This requirement is the development trend of smart distribution networks [2] . Generally, a primary differential ring (PDR) is a minimal differential protected zone in a primary protection, e.g., PDR1-3 shown in Fig. 2 . However, it is unsuitable for VOLUME 7, 2019 implementing a backup protection. Using the locally extended communication structure (Fig. 1(b) ), the backup differential ring (BDR) can be obtained by extending the primary differential protected zone to the adjacent zone, e.g., BDR1 and BDR2 as shown in Fig. 2 . Note that BDR1 and BDR2 are the minimal extension of the PDR2. In contrast, the BDRs in WADP such as in [36] - [38] are developed by extending the PDR outwards and continuously until it comes to the outermost boundary of the protected region. Thus, the corresponding backup protection is only applied in WADP and its computation becomes prohibitively expensive, especially for the complex distribution networks.
B. PARAMETER COORDINATION OF DIFFERENTIAL BACKUP PROTECTION
Taking Fig.2 as an example, the fault location rule of the current differential protection is shown in (1)
where I s is starting restraint current, I s,m is maximum unbalanced current (the differential threshold current), I r is restraint current and K r is a restraint coefficient. For the differential primary protection, I s = İ M +İ N and I r = İ M −İ N , while for differential backup protection,
The upper part of the (1) prevents the misoperation in the presence of the external fault, and the lower part ensures a correct action in the case of the internal fault. The restraint coefficient, K r , should be set in the range of 0.3-0.5(or fixed 0.4) for avoiding differential protection malfunction caused by current transformer (CT) saturation [6] .
However, for differential backup protection, the differential threshold current (i.e., maximum unbalanced current) I s,m , should be adopted based on the laterals rating so as not to pick up the load currents in BDR,
where F is a safety factor [4] which is typically in range of 1.2-1.5.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL BACKUP PROTECTION STRATEGY
A fast and integrated differential backup protection strategy is proposed in this section. The main idea of the proposed strategy is summarized as follows:
1) The devices (CTs, communication, breakers and IITs) are checked periodically by proposed detection method during the normal operation process, which aims to predict the status of device-related primary protection. After all, the primary protection failure must be caused by the device failures.
2) The predictably failed primary protection will be locked in real time.
3) When an electrical fault occurs, the device failurerelated backup protection will be started in advance to isolate the electrical fault, instead of the predictably failed primary protection.
Therefore, the proposed backup strategy based on the idea can minimize the backup fault clearance time without misoperation. In this sense, the idea of the proposed strategy and the device detection method are main contributions of this paper. The rest of this section includes the device detection method, the integrated differential backup strategy and performance analysis of response time of the proposed backup strategy, respectively in subsections A, B and C.
A. DEVICE DETECTION METHOD 1) CT FAILURE DETECTION
The CT failures include CT disconnection and saturation. This paper does not consider CT saturation detection because the CT saturation has little impact on differential principle (KCL) and the impact can be further weaken by setting appropriate restraint coefficient [41] . The CT disconnection can be detected from zero sequence current and phase difference current in differential zone [42] . The criterion of CT disconnection is given in (3).
where I M 0 and I N 0 are zero sequence current of ends of differential zone, I MK (= 6%I n ) is the threshold current (here I n is rated current), I CDMAX is the current of the end, which of phase difference current is maximum among the three phase difference currents in differential zone, and I WI is the threshold with no current.
Rule 1: if the disconnection criterion, i.e., (3), is satisfied for a CT, the CT must be disconnected, and the CT failurerelated differential primary protections will be locked in time.
For example, when a CT disconnection occurs at S2 in Fig. 2 , the CT failure-related differential primary protections in PDR1 and PDR2 are locked rapidly.
2) COMMUNICATION FAILURE DETECTION
Rule 2: if an IIT sends 10 detection frame to each of its neighbors continuously and the number of received acknowledgement frame is less than 4, the communication failure between the IIT and the neighbor node is indicated.
3) BREAKER REJECTION DETECTION
Rule 3: For a BDR in which one PDR can locate the electrical fault (it means that the fault location of the primary protection in the PDR is normal) but other PDRs cannot, if the line in the BDR is still overcurrent after a delay, the circuit breaker rejection at the overlapping position of the PDRs in the BDR can be detected by the BDR.
Taking a fault occurring at F1 in Fig. 2 as an example, if IIT1 locates the fault in BDR1 and detects that the fault occurs in PDR2 but not in PDR1, and if IIT1 detects that the line between S1 and S3 is still overcurrent after a delay ( T ), IIT1 can confirm the breaker S2 (IIT2) rejection and trips its breaker S1 as backup to locate the electrical fault; meanwhile IIT4 will not misoperate because its line is not overcurrent owing to the normal trip of breaker S3. Note that the aforementioned delay ( T ) is the fault clearance time of differential primary protection, which is typically in range of 0.08s-0.20s (mainly depends on voltage and breaker type) [43] , [44] . Note that IIT failure is classified as communication failure in this paper, because the failed IIT cannot communicate with others. 
B. INTEGRATED DIFFERENTIAL BACKUP PROTECTION STRATEGY
An integrated differential backup protection system is proposed, as shown in Fig. 3 . After the system starts up, the CT and communication devices are checked periodically (every 15 seconds) during the normal operation process. The device checks have no significant impact on the total primary (or backup) operating time because the primary (or backup) protection acts after electrical fault. Once a failure of device is detected, the device failure-related primary protection is locked rapidly. More specifically, other features of the proposed protection system are given as follows.
1) STARTING CONDITION CHECK
Once a fault occurs and the starting condition (Rule 4) is satisfied, both the primary and backup protection is started immediately.
Rule 4: if a special circumstance change such as zero sequence overcurrent, phase overcurrent or undervoltage is detected, the starting condition is met.
2) DEALING WITH A COMMUNICATION FAILURE
Rule 5: Given an electrical fault occurring in a PDR with a failed communication (Rule 2), if the line in the PDR is still overcurrent after a delay ( T ) and the communication in other PDRs runs well, the electrical fault can be located by the PDR.
For example, when an electrical fault F1 occurs and the communication fails between IIT2 and IIT3, if the line between IIT2 and IIT3 is still overcurrent after a delay ( T ), the fault F1 must occur between IIT2 and IIT3. Note that the delay time should be well set so that primary protection with non-failed communication have a priority as compared with the backup processing.
3) BACKUP PROCESSING UNDER A CT FAILURE
Rule 6: Given an electrical fault, if all primary protections in a BDR are locked (Rule 1) and the backup protection in the BDR locates the electrical fault, the IITs at the ends of BDR trip rapidly their breakers to isolate electrical fault (see also the related process in the red dashed rectangular of Fig. 3) .
Take Fig. 2 as an example, supposed that the CT2 of IIT2 disconnects and an electrical fault occurs at F1, then the primary protections in PDR1 and PDR2 within BDR1 are locked before the electrical fault (Rule 1), and the backup protection in BDR1 can locate the electrical fault promptly. According Rule 6, IIT1 and IIT3 at the ends of BDR1 trip their breakers to isolate the electrical fault, meanwhile IIT4 in BDR2 does not misoperate because the primary protection in PDR3 is not locked (i.e., Rule 6 is not satisfied for BDR2).
4) BACKUP PROCESSING UNDER A BREAKER REJECTION
Rule 7: if an IIT detects a breaker rejection of its neighbor IIT (Rule 3), the IIT sends a trip signal to isolate electrical fault.
For example, a fault occurs at F1 in Fig. 2 , once IIT1 detects a breaker rejection of its neighbor IIT2 (Rule 3), it opens its breaker to isolate the electrical fault. From above analysis, it can be observed that for the fault F1, the breaker S1 is the backup of breaker S2 and breaker S4 is the backup of breaker S3.
5) Correction of false tripping
Rule 8: if a false tripping operation is detected by using the differential current data in PDRs and BDRs, the corresponding correction instruction is sent to the related IIT to correct the false operation.
For instance, a false tripping operation of S2 is detected by using BDR1 and BDR2 (in Fig. 2 ), the corresponding IIT2 will reclose S2.
It is noted that each IIT is an independent actuator in the integrated differential backup protection system, and when the proposed backup protection fails, the integrated protection can automatically turn into conventional three-section overcurrent protection according SD276-88 standard [43] . From the above analysis, one can see that the proposed backup system based on device detection can accelerate the backup fault isolation, and the backup fault range is only expanded to the upper level circuit breaker. The detailed time performance of the proposed backup protection will be explained in the next subsection. 
C. TIME ADVANTAGE OF THE PROPOSED BACKUP STRATEGY
In the traditional protection, as shown in Fig. 4(a) , the backup fault clearance time under a failure [45] is given by
where t p = t p,c −t f is the fault clearance time of the primary protection (here t p,c is trip signal output time of primary protection and t f is time of fault inception), t b = t b,c − t b is the fault clearance time of backup protection (where t b,c is fault current interruption time of traditional backup protection and t b is starting time of traditional backup protection), t pb is a time delay which is used to provide a margin between primary and backup actions. Obviously, there are differences of the primary fault clearance time between current differential protection and other protections, and the clearance time of the former is less than that of the latter generally [3] . For better comparing the proposed backup protection with the traditional backup protection, we suppose that all of them are conservatively equivalent in this paper.
Based on the above hypothesis, under a breaker or a communication failure, the fault clearance time of the proposed backup protection (Fig. 4(b) ) can be given by In Fig 4 (b-c) , the reduced time by the proposed method in comparison with existing conventional backup protection is identified as the difference of fault clearance time between the conventional and proposed backup protections. From Fig. 4(a-b) , one can see that compared with the traditional protection, the proposed backup protection under a breaker or a communication failure can reduce the fault clearance time by the time interval t bd (i.e. the time of backup communication and calculation).
In the case of primary protection failure caused by CT failure, the proposed backup protection is directly started to send backup trip signal (at t p,s ) to locate the electrical fault, instead of the predictably failed and locked primary protection (Rule 6). Thus, as shown in Fig. 4(c) , the backup fault clearance time under a CT failure is very close to the primary fault clearance time.
The above theoretical analysis shows that the proposed backup protection can isolate fault faster than the traditional backup protections, because the proposed backup protection can be stared in advance in the case of breaker (or communication) failure and the proposed backup protection in the presence of CT failure can be directly started by replacing the predictably failed primary protection. The related time performance will be tested in the next section.
V. CASE STUDY
The principles used in the proposed backup strategy are tested on the realistic system and the RTDS-based simulation system ( Fig. 5(a, b) ). The former is used for testing typical fault scenarios under single device failure, while the latter is used for simulating complex fault scenarios. For the purpose of comparison, the existing conventional backup methods in [8] , [17] , and [37] are also applied to resolve the backup problem.
A. REALISTIC SYSTEM
The realistic system is used to test the 10kV distribution system (Fig. 2) which, for the sake of test safety, is simulated by a low voltage system whose rated phase voltage is 220 V. The restraint coefficient K r of the differential primary and backup protection in (1) is set as constant 0.4 according SD276-88 standard [43] . To simulate the single-phase grounding fault F1 with a DG, the current sampling directions of IIT1 and IIT2 are the same, while the current sampling directions of IIT3 and IIT4 are in reverse. Due to the practical limitations, the grounding fault is simulated by increasing the load current, which results in an increased branch current. The rated line current is set to 3A, the starting current for overcurrent detection is set to 5A. Note that the tested trip signals are shown in different scales for better experimental observation.
1) DEVICE FAULT DETECTION:
In this case, the CT, communication and breaker failures are simulated by artificially disconnecting the CT output, communication channels and breaker control ports, and the detected device state are outputted from the indicator lights of IITs. The test results in Table 2 show that the proposed device detection method is effective and high accurate. 
2) SCENARIO 1 (BACKUP TRIP UNDER CT FAILURE):
In this case, the fault occurs at F1, and the primary protection in PDR2 is locked because of CT failure. The backup IIT1 and IIT3 in BDR1 trip their associated relays to isolate the fault F1 rapidly (Rule 6), instead of the predictably failed and locked primary protection (explained in Fig. 4(c) ). As shown in Fig. 6 , the fault clearance time of the backup protection is 63ms (approximately 3 cycles), where the time from fault inception to relay tripping (i.e., sending a trip signal to the backup breaker), equals about 37ms (approximately 2 cycles).
3) SCENARIO 2 (BACKUP TRIP UNDER PRIMARY BREAKER REJECTION):
In this case, a fault occurs at F1, both IIT2 and IIT3 in PDR2 detect the fault and trip their relays, and the breaker S3 implements break-brake operation successfully but breaker S2 fails. After the predefined delay, IIT1 in the BDR1 detects the rejection of S2 (Rule 3) and opens its breaker S1 to isolate the fault (Rule 7) (explained in Fig. 4(b) ). Since there exists a time difference in data transmission and breaker tripping between the different IITs, the predefined delay ( T ) is set as 90ms in this paper. Fig. 7 gives the test result. From Fig. 7 , it can be seen that the IIT1 outputs the trip signal of S1 at about 123ms after fault inception and the fault clearance time by backup protection is 143ms (7 cycles).
4) SCENARIO 3 (BACKUP TRIP UNDER COMMUNICATION FAILURE):
In this case, the communication between IIT2 and IIT3 fails in the PDR2, and a grounding fault occurs at F1. IIT2 and IIT3 in PDR2 fail to locate the fault F1 due to the communication failure. In the same vein, the backup IIT1and IIT4 in BDR1 and BDR2 also fail to locate the fault. After the predefined delay, IIT2 and IIT3 in PDR2 trip their associated relays since they detect that the fault line is still not cleared (Rule 5). Fig. 8 gives the simulation result. Fig. 8 shows that the fault clearance time of backup protection is about 150ms (7.5 cycles). The result indicates that the electrical faults can be isolated to avoid the fault expansion by using the proposed backup protection even in the presence of communication failures. 
5) SCENARIO 4 (CORRECTION OF FALSE TRIPPING):
In this case, the primary breaker S2 falsely trips under normal circumstance due to the data error in PDR2. By using both PDR2 and BDR1, the backup IIT1 detects the false action of S2 and instructs S2 to reclose (Rule 8). The whole restoring time is about 416ms, and the dynamic process is shown in Fig. 9 . For the purpose of comparison, the ADP [17] and WADP [8] , [37] methods are also used in the above scenarios and Table 3 gives the simulation results. From the above scenarios, it can be observed that the proposed backup protection strategy has several advantages, as follows: 1) the proposed device detection method can detect device failures accurately; 2) the proposed backup strategy can correctly locate electrical faults and possesses an excellent performance on rapidity and stability because the proposed backup protection can be started in advance to isolate the electrical fault, instead of the faulted primary protection predicted by the proposed device detection method; 3) in comparison with the ADP [17] and WADP [8] , [37] methods, the proposed method has less backup fault clearance time and smaller fault isolation range. 
B. RTDS SIMULATION OF A DEMONSTRATION DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
In this section, a 10kV distribution network with DGs ( Fig. 10) is used for simulating more complex scenarios. As shown in Fig. 5(b) , the experimental platform is mainly composed of the RTDS system and the IITs. Note that these DGs are modeled by AC generators in the RTDS. Fig. 11 is the recorded test waveforms and Table 4 gives the test results of different scenarios. Note that the relays with a head ''RE'' in Fig. 11 refer to the relays in IITs, and the relay and its corresponding breaker have the same number in their names. The breakers S5, S15 and S23 act as tie switches. The following typical cases are selected to be described in details.
1) CT DISCONNECTING AND BREAKER REJECTING
In this case (the 4th scenario in Table 4 ), three-phase grounding fault F1 occurs at T 1 = 104ms, and the CT of breaker S2 is disconnected and the breaker S3 refuses to act. As shown in Fig. 11(a) , the CT disconnection of S2 leads to the primary protection failure regarding S2 and S3. The associated IITs of backup S1 and S3 locate the grounding fault in time and trip the relays (i.e., RE1and RE3) at T 2 = 143ms. IIT4 detects breaker S3 rejection and sends the tripping commands to isolate the false F1 after a predefined delay, and the relay RE4 trips at T 3 = 233ms. Finally, the fault is isolated completely at T 4 = 252ms, the total fault clearance time by the backup protection is 148ms.
2) CT DISCONNECTION AND COMMUNICATION FAILURE
In this case (the 8th scenario in Table 4 ), a single-phase ground fault occurs at F3, the CT of S20 is disconnected and a communication failure occurs between S20 and S21. While the CT disconnection leads to the primary protection failure regarding S20 and S21. The communication failure between S20 and S21 causes that backup S19 and S21 cannot locate the ground fault. After a predefined delay, the IIT20 and IIT21 detect that the line between them is still overcurrent, then makes sure that the fault occurs in this backup area and trips their breakers immediately. The backup fault clearance time is 151ms, as shown in the Scenario 8 of Table 4 .
3) BREAKER REFUSING TO TRIP AND COMMUNICATION FAILURE
In this case (the 9th scenario in Table 4 ), single phase ground fault F3 occurs at T 1 = 90ms, S20 rejects to act, and the communication between S20 and S21 fails. Fig. 11(b) shows the IIT20 and IIT21 cannot deal with the ground fault F3 because of the communication failure.
After a predefined time delay, the IIT20 and IIT21 find the line fault still exists and trip their relays (i.e., RE20 and RE21) at T 2 = 193ms. However, the IIT19 detects that its neighbor breaker S20 refuses to act, then sends the tripping command to isolate the false F3. Finally, the relay RE19 switches off to isolate the false F3 at T 3 = 272ms successfully and the total backup fault clearance time equals 195ms.
From the results simulated by the RTDS system ( Fig. 11 and Table 4 ), one can see that even in the presence of the multiple device failures, the proposed backup protection strategy is still effective to locate and isolate fault, and the fault isolation area is only expanded to the upper level circuit breaker.
VI. CONCLUSION
A novel backup protection strategy based on device detection is proposed for distribution systems with DGs in this paper, which has the following three characteristics:
1) The proposed device detection method can predict the status of device failure-related primary protection accurately. 2) When an electrical fault occurs, the device failurerelated backup protection will be started in advance to isolate the electrical fault, instead of the predictably failed primary protection, and the extended local communication architecture provides with rapid backup communication channels for the proposed backup strategy, thus the proposed backup strategy possesses an excellent performance on rapidity and stability. 3) Since the BDRs are minimally extended from PDRs, the proposed backup strategy can minimize the backup fault isolation zone to the upper level circuit breaker. Simulation tests on the realistic system and the RTDS system both verify that the proposed backup strategy is reliable, fault tolerant and practical.
